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A TALE OF TWO LAWS 
Barbara A. Black* 
THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT. By Patrick s. 
Atiyah. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979. Pp. viii, 791. 
$49.50. 
This is a splendid big book.1 Patrick Atiyah has written a work 
of legal history as intellectual history, set in the broad context of 
three centuries of social, economic, and political development. A 
penetrating history of legal ideas merges, in this work, into a critique 
of the dominant ideas, for they are revealed to the historian as owing 
their existence not to their validity under the glass of eternity, but to 
the temporal and the cultural. What we think of today as contract, 
says Atiyah, is what we were educated to think in the nineteenth 
century. And what we were taught mistakes the nature of contrac-
tual liability, conceiving it, first, to be unitary, and second, to be es-
sentially directed at the warranting of promise-at securing to a 
promisee that which was promised, or compensation therefor. But, 
Atiyah asserts, contractual liability is in truth diffuse. Three interests 
claim the protection of a law of contract.2 In descending order of the 
strength of their claim, they are: the restitution interest (arising from 
the receipt of benefit), the reliance interest (arising from reasonable 
reliance on an express or implied promise), and the expectation in-
terest (arising from an expectation that a promise will be kept). 
It would seem that to the author, this is a natural order of prece-
dence, perhaps enjoying just that eternal validity that he rejects for 
the entrenched view, but at the very least sounding deep in human 
experience (p. 4). It is this conviction which imparts to the work an 
earnestness and depth commanding respect and demanding atten-
tion. Atiyah does not, however, ask that we accept his priorities; he 
asks, rather, for recognition of the relationship between these inter-
ests and ultimate values, 3 the better to weigh the values and get on 
* Associate Professor, Yale Law School. B.A. 1953, Brooklyn College; LL.B. 1955, Co-
lumbia University; Ph.D. 1975, Yale University. - Ed. 
l. Cf. Atiyah, Book Review, 77 PoL. Sci. REV. 636 (1977) (reviewing Gilmore's The .Death 
of Contract with the opening sentence, "This is a splendid little book."). 
2. Atiyah here follows Fuller and Perdue, Jne Reliance Interest in Contract .Damages, (pts. 
1-2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937). 
3. "Promise-based liability rests upon a belief in the traditional liberal values of free 
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with the job of choosing among them. 
It is fascinating to note the recent explosion of scholarly interest 
in, and controversy around, the history of contract, a subject one 
might once have thought not likely to excite the sensibilities, much 
less elevate the blood pressure. This book is an intriguing blend of 
existing scholarship on that now much-worked subject. Thus one 
finds much that is familiar, nor does Atiyah suggest otherwise, pre-
ferring simply to demonstrate the remarkable potential of the famil-
iar. Taking his springboard where he finds it, he lands on his own 
feet. Influences most immediately visible (and acknowledged) in The 
Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract are those of Fuller and Perdue 
(whose brilliant article apparently sparked the whole enterprise, and 
certainly supplies the analytic scheme)4, Simpson,5 Horwitz,6 Gil-
more, 7 and Friedman. 8 A fitful, uneasy combination, particularly in 
view of some recent commentary and controversy. Atiyah, whose 
account of the common law of contract through the nineteenth cen-
tury most closely resembles that of Morton Horwitz,9 tells us in the 
preface: "I believe that the general story I tell in this work is broadly 
in line with Professor Simpson's History, though I am not confident 
that he himself would endorse that view" (p. viii). Readers of Simp-
son's recent comments o~ Horwitz's work10 must share Atiyah's 
doubts. Sharers of Simpson's doubts about Horwitz's thesis must -
really must! - read Atiyah. In this extended treatment of the sub-
ject, Atiyah has had the opportunity to develop fully certain themes 
necessarily dealt with more perfunctorily by Horwitz. At certain 
points, Atiyah's presentation serves as a neat - if fortuitous - re-
buttal of Simpson. 
I. THE LAW OF CONTRACT: THE FIRST HALF-TURN 
Quickening through the eighteenth century, an anachronism by 
choice," benefit-based liability is neutral, and reliance-based liability is positively "hostile to 
the values of free choice," involving, rather, values "closely associated with a paternalist social 
philosophy and a redistributive economic system." Pp. 6-7. 
4. As Aliyah declares. 
5. A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (1975). 
6. M. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977), 
7. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). But there is at least one essential dif-
ference between Aliyah and Gilmore. Contract's demise, to Gilmore, is conceptual; Aliyah 
sees (and mourns) the continued vitality of the very concept Gilmore thinks dead. 
8. L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965). 
9. Horwitz, however, is concerned primarily with American law, Aliyah exclusively with 
English. 
10. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 
(1979). 
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1970, freedom of contract was in its "heyday" from 1770 to 1870 (p. 
501). During that period, as contract, in tune and in common with 
the world around it, turned upside down, classical contract theory 
was hammered out. Even the fact of theory was a new departure; 
early English contract law muddled along without it (p. 139). That 
early law is, however, susceptible of description, or at any rate, of 
identification of salient characteristics.11 According to Atiyah, it was 
concerned with fairness, with protection of the weak from the strong, 
broadly, with the imposition of external, community-rooted values 
- including those of just price and wage - rather than with the 
implementation of individual intent and will. And, as it happened, 
belief in the absolutely binding nature of promises rode low. Coher-
ently, then, the promise occupied a subordinate position, being 
"neither necessary nor sufficient" for imposition of contractual lia-
bility.12 The law was, "perhaps primarily," concerned with benefit 
and reliance; it was "consideration-based" rather than "promise-
based." The law's concern with what had been done (with benefits 
received, with acts performed in reliance) and lack of interest in 
what had been said (in the mere fact of agreement) was expressed in 
emphasis on the part-executed contract and disdain for the wholly 
executory contract. "The notion that a promisee was entitled to have 
his expectations protected, purely and simply as such, as a result of a 
promise and nothing else, was not generally accepted in eighteenth-
century law" (p. 142). We are told that it was not even entirely clear, 
in the eighteenth century, "that promises and contract were ways of 
creating wholly new obligations" (p. 141). 13 In early law one might 
be bound because of an agreement, but it was understood that the 
law was doing the binding - and thus might, without apology, de-
cline to do so if the agreement offended notions of fairness, or, con-
versely, might unembarrassedly bind one in the absence of 
agreement. In this system, what has come to be known as quasi-
contract was doctrinally powerful, Chancery and the jury institution-
ally pre-eminent. 
But the eighteenth century, pivotal as well as transitional, 14 saw 
the stirrings of discontent with this state of the law and with Elizabe-
than regulation and protectionism in general. Still agricultural, still 
11. Atiyah's chapters six and seven, pp. 139-216, discuss contract law and theory in 1770. 
12. The promise served primarily an evidentiary function. See note 30 1°'!.fra. 
13. The tort-contract dichotomy so familiar to us was not then developed. 
14. See, e.g., pp. 90, 138, 146, 176. Somewhere in print in the last year or so there ap-
peared a cartoon in which, seated in the Garden, Adam says, "Eve, we are living in an age of 
transition." 
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sparsely populated, England was nonetheless rushing headlong to-
ward its commercial and industrial destiny - a national market and 
a market economy. The stage was set: Stability is essential to the 
functioning of a market economy, and in the years since the Glori-
ous Revolution, multiple instabilities - political, financial, and legal 
- had been overcome. 15 The need was great: In an era of febrile 
commercial and industrial activity, planning moves front and center; 
predictability is iron entrepreneurial necessity. And the demand was 
irresistible: "The new man of the 18th century was an individualist" 
(p. 41 ); freedom and competition were not to be denied him. En-
gland went from property to contract (pp. 102-12), 16 and classical 
contract theory took shape around the executory contract, a fit de-
vice for the allocation of risk, a useful instrument of private plan-
ning. As "newer" - that is to say revived (pp. 140-41)-notions of 
the absolutely binding nature of promise took hold, contractual lia-
bility came to be thought of, and treated as, promise-based. The 
wholly executory contract became the paradigm, protection of mere 
expectation the norm. The time frame shifted, the eagle eye of the 
law now searching for the moment at which a party could no longer 
escape obligation, could no longer change his mind; the moment of 
contract formation, determined by newly emergent rules of offer and 
acceptance (pp. 446-48), became everything. 
As it became clear that ''wholly new obligations" might indeed 
be created by "promises and contract," the role oflaw was obscured, 
and law itself degraded: The law might be necessary for enforce-
-ment of the parties' agreement, but its opinion of the agreement, ide-
ally at least, was a matter of the sublimest unconcern - its 
approbation was not sought, nor, therefore, its disapprobation per-
mitted. The fairness of an exchange was irrelevant. "Freedom" to 
make the agreements one wished to make, confidence that if you 
were bound so was the other fellow, might be compromised by scru-
tiny of the content of the agreement, by its invalidation, or even 
adjustment, in the name of fairness. Thus, logically, equity - ear-
lier the means of avoiding an unfair exchange - declined, and con-
comitantly the jury came under control, its power to right wrongs by 
reduction of damages in inequitable situations much curtailed (pp. 
388-97). Consideration, potentially (and once) a meaningful check 
on the power of one individual to take advantage of another, dwin-
15. Atiyah tends to stress the stability of the eighteenth century - though not simplisti-
cally. See, e.g., pp. 23-24, 33-34. 
16. Freedom of property was a necessary precursor to freedom of contract. P. 85. For 
contract law and theory, 1770-1870, see chapters 14 and 15, pp. 398-505. 
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dled into insignificance as a requirement, its "substantive core . . . 
eliminated by the move to the executory contract" (p. 454). Nor, 
consent now having become the essence of contractual obligation, 
could the law impose contractual obligation in the absence of con-
sent by protection of reliance and benefit as such. Quasi-contract 
and, more generally, liability for anything but promise, declined. In 
short, the promise had become both necessary and sufficient: One 
was free to bind oneself, free to depend on the other party's having 
bound himself, and freed of the threat of being otherwise bound. 
II. THE POWER OF PROMISE 
Thus we have the transformation of "The Good Old Law" (as 
Simpson has ironically dubbed it17 and Atiyah evidently regards it) 
into· a law which Atiyah considers amoral 18 and unfortunate. The 
propounder of this still-revisionist version of legal development 
must overcome tradition which despite earlier attack along these 
lines, represents for most people conviction, if not dogma. Atiyah, 
encountering familiar, anticipable hurdles, takes them with an elan 
and grace which are a joy to behold; point after point, time after 
time, an argument is made which, for acuteness, breadth, creative-
ness, candidness - for over-all quality - is nowhere surpassed in 
today's legal history scholarship. That is not to say that all fences 
are cleared. In my own judgment it remains unlikely that the execu-
tory exchange was as little regarded and as scantily protected before 
1770 as Atiyah suggests. For that reason alone, the nineteenth cen-
tury, even if it were as close to enthronement of the bare promise as 
Atiyah suggests, would not be the revolution that is also suggested. 
And the nineteenth century was a longer way from the rule of prom-
ise than this work suggests. 
Slade's Case 19 will serve to illustrate Atiyah's difficulties with 
pre-classical law and to symbolize a broader difficulty. Atiyah 
presents Slade's Case as an important step on the road to consensual 
liability: "it became easier to think of the liability ... as the crea-
tion of the parties" (p. 120). Coke argued that there cannot be a 
contract without mutual promises or reciprocal agreement: Was that, 
Atiyah wonders, a new attitude, perhaps more innovative than it still 
seems to us (p. 120)? Well, perhaps, but it is not conceivable that 
Slade's Case - and the history of assumpsit in general - will not 
17. Simpson, supra note 10, at 535. 
18. Some of the "moral flavour" of the eighteenth century was carried over into 
nineteenth-century law, but evidently not much. P. 368. 
19. 76 Eng. Rep. 1072, 4 Co. Rep. 91a. 
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raise doubts about the negligibility, in early law, of agreement, 
choice, promise (pp. 198-205). It is, needless to say, one of Atiyah's 
main tasks to allay our doubts, and he leaves no base untouched in 
tackling it. 
One obvious answer, offered here and at the many points in the 
book where similar doubts crop up, is that one must not demand the 
impossible: ideas are not born in a moment, and do not die at a 
stroke; old and new traditions co-exist, happily or otherwise. "Neat 
history" is an oxymoron. The book is liberally sprinkled with cave-
ats along this line, 20 and the reader must respect them. More impres-
sively, the message is conveyed in the over-all tone of this book - in 
the author's moderation, balance, avoidance of the doctrinaire, deep 
sense of historical complexity - and the reader will respect this. On 
the other hand, all scales, sufficiently weighted, will tip, and the 
reader will also have to decide whether, finally, the overlappings, 
intrusions, anomalies, and contradictions overpower the thesis. 
Another answer to our doubts about the unimportance of prom-
ise prior to the nineteenth century lies in Chancery, where, in any 
event, most contract litigation took place (p. 147). If the common · 
law was rife with economic liberalism (pp. 112-38), Chancery tradi-
tions were paternalistic (p. 116). Atiyah's thesis, that "the law was 
inevitably and fundamentally concerned about the fairness of an ex-
change" (p. 168), does not depend exclusively on Chancery. Al-
though admitting, in typically, engagingly, straightforward fashion, 
that "there has never been an overt principle of fairness in the com-
mon law of contract" (p. 146), the author, still typically and quite as 
engagingly, refuses to believe in the imperviousness of even the com-
mon lawyers to the morality of their time (p. 147). But the heart of 
the case lies in Chancery: First, Atiyah asserts that "Chancellors 
nearly always relieved against excessively unfair bargains . . ." (p. 
116) - further than scholars have thus far been willing to go. Sec-
ond, the author claims that when Chancellors refused relief, they 
were depending upon the jury to do equity; ultimate conviction here 
must rest on one's willingness to accept the widely, but not univer-
sally,21 held belief that jury control over damages ensured fairness. 
20. E.g., pp. 262-63, 404-05. On the fair exchange, see pp. 146-349 and 167-77. For a 
discussion of caveat emptor see pp. 178-80, 464-79. Caveat emptor, at least as vital in old as in 
classical law (or so one might easily conclude from the evidence here), is not helpful to 
Aliyah's thesis. 
21. See Simpson, supra note 10, at 574-75. Atiyah recognizes, in the benefit context, that 
juries were not reliably upholders of customary morality. Judges, he says, took cases from 
juries when they did not trust juries to find implied promises in cases the judge thought de-
manded the finding. 
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Atiyah's argument on the fair exchange may or may not move the 
world to full agreement, but a more powerful argument for this point 
of view will not soon see the light of day.22 
In the end, however, Atiyah's most direct answer to the troubling 
implications of assumpsit is that the award of expectation damages 
was 
largely unknown prior to the end of the eighteenth century, and ... in 
the absence of that characteristic it is misleading to speak of wholly 
executory contracts, or of consensual liability. It is true that the recog-
nition of "promise for promise" as constituting a ground of liability 
prior to performance or reliance must have contained the seeds of con-
sensual liability. But this was not the consensual liability known to 
nineteenth-century lawyers. [P. 199.] 
Atiyah here contrasts the award of price, as in the early period, with 
the later (as he believes) practice of awarding difference money. The 
expectation interest, as such, is not in focus in Atiyah's presentation 
- it was clearly protected in both periods. The point here is not the 
failure of early law to protect the expectation interest, but its funda-
mental unconcern with the executory contract. The difference 
formula eliminates the anticipation of plaintiffs return performance 
which, when independent covenant rules governed, lay behind the 
award of the price. It was assumed in the earlier period that the 
contract would be executed, defendant being entitled to enforce per-
formance in a later action. The change was from expectation of per-
formance to expectation of profit (pp. 428-29). Until that change, "it 
is not really possible to talk of a proper law of executory contracts" 
(p. 200).23 The further and all-important step, taken later, is that the 
executo,y contract, becoming the paradigm, drove all rivals from the 
field. Even the part-executed contract, with elements of reliance 
and/ or benefit was tested for, and valued only if in, congruence to 
the paradigm, the other, once essential, elements given no shrift. 
22. Atiyah's argument moves from convincing reinterpretation of cases (e.g. Sturlyn v. Al-
bany), through rethinking of the concept of "mere inadequacy," to adoption and ingenious 
adaptation of broad societal theory-Douglas Hay's in terrorem theory. P. IOI. Atiyah uses 
this last in partial explanation of nineteenth- (and twentieth-) century misconceptions about 
the role of the Chancellor in ensuring fairness ("Chancellors nearly always relieved against 
excessively unfair bargains, but did not want to say so .•.. "). P. 193 (emphasis added). 
Somewhat later the position is stated thus: "A considerable degree of flexibility in the attitude 
of Equity to hard and unconscionable bargains .... " P. 448. One must remain doubtful 
about such statements as: "As the protection of the common sailor shows, Chancery's protec-
tive mantle was available for whoever could bring his case before the Court." P. 173. And 
here, as elsewhere, Atiyah is driven finally to pointing out that the eighteenth century was 
transitional - that the new morality (individualism and risk-taking) coexisted with the old, so 
that decisions which do not demonstrate a fundamental concern with fairness are examples of 
the nineteenth-century mentality in its infancy. P. 176. 
23. For damages in the nineteenth century, see pp. 424-34. 
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That is the critical transition, critical because it culminates in reduc-
tion of protection of reliance and benefit, and Atiyah suggests that 
even if the expectation interest was, in early law, protected, so long 
as the interest lay in performance, this critical shift had not taken 
place. 
There is no gainsaying the coherence and cogency of this argu-
ment; its ultimate force, however, must depend on the validity of the 
proposition that early law did not award difference damages. That is 
dubious, and in any case unknowable since, once again, jury control 
obscures. One would not, however, doubt an increase in the number 
of such awards, and an increased emphasis along the lines suggested. 
The sufficiency of promise in the nineteenth century runs smack 
into consideration. When one sets out to prove that a "considera-
tion-based" law was transformed into a "promise-based" law, any 
lingering traces of a consideration requirement - unless reduced to 
form, or better, fiction, or best of all, farce - are an embarrassment. 
While recognizing that Mansfield desired nothing more than the re-
duction to rubble of the requirement, most of us have thought that 
he did not succeed; Atiyah thinks otherwise (pp. 448-54). 
One aspect of consideration manages to plague Atiyah early and 
late - that is, the moral obligation, or, really, past consideration, 
doctrine (pp. 162-64, 491-93). If benefit had the force in pre-1770 
law that Atiyah suggests, the refusal of the courts to accept past con-
sideration is at least anomalous. Atiyah adopts Simpson's insight 
here: when consideration, as in early usage, means no more than 
reason, the best consideration, because the best reason, is a moral 
obligation to do as promised. " 'Hence in the early history of consid-
eration it must be appreciated that what has come to be called pre-
existing 'moral' obligation . . . was not some curious aberration; it 
logically lay at the heart of the doctrine.' "24 Mansfield's adoption of 
moral obligation as sufficient to support a promise was thus not the 
innovation it has been thought, but rather an affirmation of a con-
cept that lay deeply rooted in history. But even if Simpson is right, it 
is Atiyah who has drawn dramatic implications from his thesis; it 
remains a problem for Atiyah that Mansfield's law was a reversal of 
the law as he found it. Similarly, the nineteenth century rejection of 
moral obligation works against theories that the bare promise was 
sufficient. Atiyah thus considers Eastwood v. Kenyon 25 "puzzling," 
invoking the "technicality" of consideration to defeat an express 
24. SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 323, quoted in P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT at 140. 
25. 113 Eng. Rep. 482 (1840). 
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promise (pp. 491-92). Moral obligation is maddening: The cases en-
forcing promises supported by moral obligation can support either 
theory - they may be used to show the court's concern with benefit, 
or with promise. What is calculated to drive theorists to drink is 
that, on the whole, we appear to see courts failing to enforce them. 
Past consideration doctrine confounds everything but bargain the-
ory. 26 
The extent to which bargain theory, even if fully in force in nine-
teenth century England,27 disturbs Atiyah's thesis, is unclear. By re-
fusing to protect unbargained-for-reliance, it is actually supportive 
of the necessity of promise; essentially, however, it seems radically 
inconsistent with the notion that the bare promise is sufficient. The 
argument must be that when the adequacy of a consideration is re-
ally irrelevant, when the law will enforce an exchange of something 
for nothing, when one may bargain away one's estate for a piece of 
paper (pp. 448-51 ), then bargain theory is problematic only in a few 
peripheral areas. Atiyah's depiction of Foakes v . .Beer28 as "a move-
ment away from the idea that a bare agreement was always binding" 
(p. 440),29 may appear to the reader less proven than asserted; it is 
possible nonetheless to argue that the doctrine of that case is, in this 
context, only marginally significant. But past consideration doctrine 
cuts a fairly wide swath - for that reason alone, and I think for 
others as well, bargain theory remains a hurdle. 
A distinguishing feature of this work is that within its major 
theme - the rise and fall of freedom of contract - there is a minor 
theme - the rise and fall of the "sanctity of promise."30 The obliga-
26. Atiyah's theory is that promise after consideration was not sufficient evidence of receipt 
of benefit: thus the doctrine of requests, with the request supplying the omission. Pp. 152-53. 
27. It is hard to be sure of Atiyah's position on this. See pp. 463, 689-90, 776. Others have 
no doubt. See J. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES (1980). 
28. 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884). 
29. See also pp. 165-67, 438-40 on forbearances and compromise. Atiyah's suggestion that 
the doctrine of Pinnel's Case and Foakes v. Beer is abhorrent only from the perspective of 
promise is too narrow - desire to do away with that doctrine may reflect (among other things) 
a different estimate of the benefit of a bird in hand. 
30. Promise, as a prominent theme, is immensely valuable but by no means problem free. 
For one thing, what the book contains of hyperbole resides almost exclusively in promise. 
Promise has never been both necessary and sufficient, or indeed either. There is at least one 
point at which Atiyah's promise-emphasis, in the form of a desire to stress the early negligibil-
ity of promise, seems to have led him into a fairly elementary error. In a system of law the 
heart of which is making people do what they ought to do, paying for benefits they received, 
and compensating for losses incurred in reasonable reliance, what, asks Atiyah, is the function 
of promise? His answer is that it is evidentiary, serving as evidence of the nature of the trans-
action, the identity of parties, and so forth. But promise serves a different and more important 
function in reliance than in benefit, for as Atiyah points out, it is promise which makes the 
reliance reasonable. The law is concerned only with induced reliance. Atiyah's recognition of 
this is signalled by a shift in terminology - promise, in reliance, is ''.justificatory." But on the 
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tory force of promise, lost sight of for a time, was rediscovered by 
Grotius and Pufendorf (pp. 140-41) and happily seized upon by the 
men of the Age of Enlightenment. It fit perfectly any number of 
needs and ideals of the time - commercial need, the ethic of 
self-discipline and self-reliance, the stress on principle. It was de-
ducible from the premises of the economists and utilitarians, and 
constituted a first principle of social life (pp. 352-54). And so the 
principle of promise, of keeping one's promise, of the "sanctity" of 
promise, flourished. Indeed, a combination of lawyers, economists, 
and capitalists saw to its flourishing, deliberately inculcating the 
"propaganda" of the absolutely binding nature ofpromises.31 Given 
all this, in this Age of Principles (pp. 345-58), "[i]t is not surprising 
that during the period 1770-1870, the principle of due observance of 
promises became the pivotal key around which the modem law of 
contract was built" (p. 353). The question is what this "pivotal key" 
had to do with the decline in protection of the restitution and reli-
ance interests. Readers may be puzzled by the author's positing of a 
certain see-saw relationship, in which an increase in protection of 
expectation led inevitably to a decline in benefit and reliance.32 As 
whole, beyond perfunctory terminological recognition of a difference, Atiyah treats reliance 
and benefit as identical in their relation to promise. The promise, that is, is subsidiary in both. 
That proposition is far more convincing in the context of benefit than in that of reliance. It is 
true that this is harmless error, the material (and indisputable) fact being that the protection of 
the expectation interest is altogether different from the protection of either the reliance interest 
or the restitution interest. But it does distract. 
31. These men were faced with the problem of "teaching social discipline to millions of 
rough, tough, largely uneducated, urbanized men and women" (pending establishment of the 
necessary bureaucracy, of an administrative machinery capable of remedying the mischiefs 
attendant upon the population explosion, the dislocation, the urbanization, and all the ills that 
industrial England was subject to). P. 358. England in 1770 was a society that largely ran 
itself; the resulting inefficiency may have had its value in "the simple, rural, preindustrial 
England of the early eighteenth century," p. 102, but the new world brought new problems: 
In due course, a bureaucratic administrative machine had to be created to cope with these 
new problems. But that took time, and in the meantime, something else had to bolster up 
the inefficiencies of administration and law. Some new discipline was needed. It is part of 
the thesis of this work that that new discipline was found in Contract. 
P. 102. 
The mechanics of discipline through contract are complex and somewhat cloudy- involv-
ing, e.g. the form of individualism reflected in self-discipline and self-reliance, pp. 272-83, but 
one thing is clear: 
[T]he absolutely binding force of bare promises was deliberately inculcated as an impor-
tant guide to social behaviour in the period between (perhaps) 1750 and 1870. It was 
adopted as part of the code of honour of gentlemen, and taught by them and lawyers and 
economists to the mass of the people, and they did so, if I am correct, because it was a 
much simpler rule of social (and legal) discipline than the more complex rules which 
would have been needed if the problem had been broken down by asking why promises 
should be obeyed. 
Pp. 654-55. 
32. One wonders whether there is, behind this, some inchoate notion of the existence of a 
phenomenon which might be labelled "maximum toleration." A number of trends in the his-
tory of contract suggest that society will, presumably because it can only, tolerate just so much 
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he puts it, with the increased importance of promise, agreement, in-
tention, there was inevitably a decline in the importance attached to 
other sources of liability (p. 455). Wherein the inevitability? And 
what connection does it have with the sanctity of promise? 
While the multifariously problematic nature of the "sanctity" of 
promise tempts one to lengthy declamation,33 here I merely suggest 
that it takes one just so far in construction of a law of contract. It 
takes one to enforcement of the bare promise as promised - that is, 
to the protection of the expectation interest. It might, if applied with 
the absolute rigor that Atiyah suggests is characteristic of a prefer-
ence for principle (over the pragmatic), lead to enforcing even the 
rashest and most disastrous promises made by the weak, the incapa-
ble, and so forth. That is logical; horrible, perhaps, but logical. But 
it has no logical tendency to produce decline in imposition of liabili-
ties which flow from the receipt of benefits or from justifiable reli-
ance. There is no way to deduce this consequence even from the 
sanctity of promise. Indeed the obligatory force of promise has had, 
more often than not, the aura of morality - the odor, indeed, of 
sanctity! There is not a little irony (as well as illogicality) in its adop-
tion being the occasion of the eradication of existing moralities with 
which it might as happily, and rather more obviously, coexist. 
But "promise" is employed rather more generally, with implica-
tions broader than those naturally flowing from the "sanctity" of 
promise; it makes sense to prefer, in this context, the word "choice." 
If contractual liability is grounded in choice, then one can see the 
logic, at least, of the decline of benefit and reliance. With law re-
duced to the ancillary task of implementing the will of individuals, 
law must not merely enforce liability when it is taken on by the par-
ties, but must also refrain from imposing it when it is not taken on by 
the parties. But logic is not necessity, nor yet, desirability. Behind 
society's adoption of an individualist ethos there were real societal 
conditions and at least perceived needs: for social discipline (itself 
assumed to be a necessary foundation for planning), for assured reli-
ance on promises, for a means of allocating risk, for all the familiar 
things which the executory contract and the protection of expecta-
enforcement of contractual liability - or, perhaps one should say so much rigor in enforce-
ment of contracts. 
33. "Sanctity" is a loaded term. Consider the "sanctity" of a promise by a consumer not to 
sue General Motors for manufacturing and selling a defective and unsafe automobile. There 
may be good reasons for enforcing that promise (in the form of a disclaimer of warranty), but 
those who would invoke the "sanctity" of promise as one of them are operating in a world of 
their own. Atiyah obviously would not, but he may invite it by linking today's trends, such as 
consumer protection, with loss of belief in the "sanctity" of promise and indeed in principle 
itself. Pp. 649-59. 
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tion are said to have provided. Why was it inevitable that when these 
conditions and needs arose, the law would cease or reduce its protec-
tion of the restitutionary and reliance interests? 
In partial explanation Atiyah tells us that: 
Judges, along with other men, lost the sense that it was just to pay 
for benefit, or reliance, without consent. Inevitably, as men became 
convinced of the importance of the free-market, as they became more 
attached to the social ideals of individualism and self-reliance, as they 
came to accept (more or less) the atomistic view of society in which all 
relationships depended on free choice, they tended also to feel that it 
was unjust that a man should have liabilities thrust upon him which he 
had not agreed to bear. [P. 456.] 
More cynical historians might write of this that we have truly discov-
ered the "inevitability" of the decline: It turns out to be the inevita-
bility of selfishness and greed. Indeed it would not even require 
cynicism to see such a development as simply a straightforward 
shrinking of the area within which law can stop people from working 
harm. Definition of freedom of contract as freedom from any obli-
gation to pay for benefits received or expenses incurred in justifiable 
reliance would be nothing but a license, for all those cagey enough to 
avoid the ritual incantation, to hurt others with impunity.34 
It must be noted that, on the evidence in Atiyah's very balanced 
account, the decline in benefit and reliance was not especially 
marked. This, while rather detracting from the overall thesis of radi-
cal change in the nineteenth century, does suggest that even if we 
incline to see the worst in such a decline, the worst was not very bad, 
or at least there was not much of it. Indeed, we are told, the decline 
was in a sense conceptual. Courts "came to perceive all liabilities as 
arising from contract, and from the consensualism they now took to 
underlie contract" (p. 455).35 Thus, even when reliance or benefit 
was present, and constituted the "primary" source of obligation, lia-
bility was based on consent; when it was felt that the situation de-
manded imposition of liability, and there was no promise available 
to seize upon, courts implied a promise - at this time there was a 
sharp rise in the number of implied promises. Moreover, when the 
case could be made to fit the classical model, damages were awarded 
to cover the full expectation interest - which in reliance cases would 
usually result in a larger award than the reliance basis of the claim. 
34. It certainly appears to have little to do (indeed, arguably to be negatively correlated in 
the case of reliance) with facilitation of planning. One more advantage to the capable. See 
Atiyah's recognition that those who insisted upon freedom and competition "surely" wanted to 
be free of the burden of cossetting the less able and the feeble, and his defense of these new 
individualists. P. 76. 
35. Note that the move is not only to consensualism, but to contract. 
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What was missing, we are told, was the idea that reliance could be 
protected "on its own." It is hard to estimate the extent to which this 
blind spot left reliance unprotected. 
But the point is that Atiyah does not incline to see the worst in 
this development, although it is one that he deplores. Even here, 
discussing what others would treat shortly as patent moral defi-
ciency, he avoids harsh judgment. He is prepared, even eager, to see 
Victorian capitalists as enlightened and humanitarian.36 Moreover, 
and to me more interestingly, the author is similarly reluctant to im-
peach the motives or bona jides of the members of the legal profes-
sion. 
Ill. LAW AND LIFE 
Analysis of the role of law in society brings one willy-nilly to the 
legal profession, which mediates the relationship. Law sees life 
outside through the eyes of the lawyers; its ability to respond to soci-
ety's needs is largely a function of the lawyers' astuteness in perceiv-
ing those needs, and wisdom and goodwill in formulating and 
guiding response. Atiyah does devote substantial attention to the 
men who made the law, bringing us details of their background, 
training, inclination, and capacity. A nice acerbity :flavors much of 
his commentary on bench and bar; he is, one may safely say, not 
blind to the shortcomings of the profession. Lawyers, in this account 
"are," "believe," and "tend to do" certain things - few of them de-
sirable. But while others, describing the same basic transformation 
of the law, may present a picture of manipulative, conspiratorial 
judges and lawyers, with a cool eye to the main chance for them-
selves and others of their class, and the ruthlessness,,skill and intelli-
gence to push it through, Atiyah engages in no such :flattery. 
Atiyah tells us that the nineteenth-century lawyers who were 
judges carried freedom of contract further than the class that bene-
fited from it, or the philosophers who are accounted its evangelists; 
36. Despite implications of manipulation, not to say conspiracy, in the "propaganda" of 
sanctity of promise, p. 654; despite both intellectual and moral reservations about free-market 
premises and conclusions; indeed, despite many of the awarenesses, insights and attitudes 
which have led others to "sinister or even Marxist" interpretation, pp. 390-39, Aliyah sturdily 
resists it. Of two major versions of nineteenth-century history, he selects the more benign. Pp. 
220-26. In the absence of proof of deliberate exploitation, or of lack of concern for human 
suffering; in the light of proof that freedom for everybody was not just a cruel joke, but re-
sulted, after a bit, in substantial gain for all, pp. 572-81; in the face of convincing evidence that 
neither capitalists nor philosophers were heart and soul committed to laissez faire, pp. 234-35, 
321, and that the new middle classes were only, at worst, ignorant of social evils and concerned 
about taxation, bureaucratic corruption, and strong central government rather than opposed to 
social reform, pp. 238-50 - well th~re is only one conclusion to reach on this reading of the 
record and Atiyah reaches it. The question, of course, is whether he reads the record correctly. 
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the common law was way ahead of all other organs of government in 
fidelity to laissez-faire. And it was all due to one variety or another 
of ingrained inadequacy. In the first place, lawyers took political 
economy to be wholehearted in its advocacy of laissez-faire, failing 
to note the reservations - which were both wide and deep. "When 
lawyers encounter ideas from outside the law, as they do from time 
to time, they tend to absorb a smattering of those ideas ... " (p. 
235). Then, the legal profession missed a revolution in government; 
from quite early in the nineteenth century, massive government in-
tervention and interference with freedom of contract were the rule, 
and the growth of a huge bureaucracy the fact. Unwelcome in many 
quarters, this was a silent revolution (pp. 231, 236-37): England 
stumbled into the modern regulatory state. But "lawyers may well 
have been slower to grasp the significance of what was happening 
than many other sections of the community" (p. 237). Finally, law-
yers "tend to absorb a smattering of those ideas which may then re-
main with them, handed down from generation to generation, until 
they eme~ge from their narrow professional interests to look at the 
same problem perhaps fifty or a hundred years later" (p. 235). And 
that explains Dicey, a true representative of a conservative fraternity, 
who thought, and taught the world, that there really had been an 
Age of Laissez-Faire (pp. 231-37). 
While the message of political economy lost something in the 
translation, it did at least get through. In contrast, the profession 
managed to avoid even hearing anything said by later economists, 
missing enlightenment on, for example, the merits of a redistributive 
legal system. Thus the exaggerated version of freedom of contract 
which had been gained through simplistic distortion of the message 
of the classical economists stayed firmly in place (p. 383). Atiyah 
describes external, accidental factors which led to the impervious-
ness of the profession to anything beyond itself from about 1870 on 
(pp. 292-94),37 but it is hardly to be doubted that lawyers who had 
wished to keep abreast might have done so. However, their failure 
to do so will seem little cause for regret if one takes the author's 
point that lawyers who make the effort to absorb economic theory 
"only succeed in understanding what was orthodox a generation or 
two back" (p. 669). 
Now one might think that even a profession as chuckle-headed as 
37. He notes especially the sharp separation of disciplines, the specialization which sent 
lawyers to the law, economists to what is now called economics, with the twain rarely, after 
1870, to meet. Furthermore, political economy and utilitarianism had an "evangelical streak" 
which ensured propagation of the message. 
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this one would eventually notice a leviathan bureaucracy and a 
plethora of statutes. And to some extent, finally, it did. But judges 
did not wish to have this fact of life affect the theory of contract, 
preferring, indeed, the mortification of resort to a "semantic trick": 
The common-law concept of contract retained its purity and its basis in 
the free market only by a process of definition. Everything which did 
not fit the scheme of the free market or of the general principles of 
contract law which were based on the free market was simply defined 
as not being part of the law of contract . . . . The law of contract be-
came increasingly pure .... [Pp. 235-36.]38 
The judicial propensity for taking leave of reality was of course 
expressed most vividly in legal formalism (pp. 388-97, 660-71). That 
judicial philosophy, the author believes, was closely related to the 
rise of the market economy, and abetted the process of converting 
early contract law into classical contract law. But, writing of the 
early rise of formalism, Atiyah expressly rejects a "class-bias" inter-
pretation, as neither demanded nor supported. He points instead to 
such very practical considerations as the need for a judicial system 
struggling with the explosion of population and of commercial and 
industrial activity to conserve time and energy. For example: Con-
trol of the jury may have arisen because of the need of commerce 
and industry for predictability; juries are also slow! Formalism, the 
author notes, did not reach its height until the 1920s and 1930s, long 
after the settling of classical contract theory. It would be possible to 
see in this "full flowering" the desire to consolidate gains made by 
the dominant classes, but Atiyah attributes it to the mediocrity of the 
judiciary in the period between World Wars. 
One is tempted to conclude, or at least to entertain the suspicion, 
that for the historian who shares Atiyah's ultimate values, perception 
of the nature of contractual liability, and reading of nineteenth-cen-
tury doctrinal development, the interpretive options as to lawyers, 
and especially judges, are few, and not happy. Again and again the 
choice appears to be dilemmatic: they are functioning either unintel-
ligently or as conscious servants of a class. Atiyah, who finds no 
shortage of incompetence, and a pervasive shelving of the intellect 
by men in thrall to a single concept, discovers no knaves or lackeys. 
IV. THE SECOND HALF-TURN 
Atiyah points out that in the course of the last century or so, En-
38. This process "had important results on the way in which the common law developed, 
and on the value system which the legal profession carried over into the twentieth century." P. 
236. As Atiyah points out, p. 236 n. 45, this idea was developed by Lawrence Friedman, but 
Atiyah puts the idea to rather special use. 
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gland has taken one more half-tum - righted itself, some of us, 
though not others, might think. If a revolution involves 360°, then, 
with a single, and singular, reservation, the English have now com-
pleted one. Modem collectivism and quasi-socialism resonate with 
the moralities of an earlier age; ideas of just price and just wage, for 
example, have revived. While laissez-faire was never the colossus it 
was for a time believed to have been, it now lies shattered and in 
ruins. Once again, enforcement of benefit-based and reliance-based 
liability thrives, while promise-based liability - indeed promise it-
self - has not the imperial power it once enjoyed. Quasi-contract 
has returned, and judicial discretion supplies what once was found in 
equity. Even tort law intrudes. Indeed, the role of contract itself has 
vastly declined. Statute does much, quasi-administrative procedures 
and the lawyer's office the remainder. When risk allocation is the 
task, devices other than the executory exchange are brought into 
play. The few pitiful leftovers belong to, and constitute, contract 
law. The classical model has, in a word, failed.39 
BUT! "Freedom of contract remains in theory the fundamental 
basis of the law . . ." (p. 687). The theory retains its charm for the 
legal profession, and its dominion over their conceptual universe -
despite daily, incontestable, overwhelming evidence that it has little 
practical applicability and enjoys virtually no practical application; 
despite its lack of consonance with social ideology, even with the 
ideology of the legal system taken as a whole, even that of the com-
mon law beyond contract; and worst of all, despite its wrongness. 
"The shadow of the classical model [has been preserved] long after 
the substance ha[s] largely vanished" (pp. 681-82). 
Atiyah places much of the responsibility for this misfortune on 
the shoulders of the legal academics of the 1920s and 30s and 40s -
it was they, the treatise writers, who canonized classical theory, and 
they did so, you will not be surprised to hear, because they were 
undistinguished - formalists almost to the man (pp. 681-93). 
Atiyah illustrates the quite awsome influence which he attributes to 
these writers by a number of concrete examples; the upshot for class-
ical contract theory, considered purely as theory, is not merely con-
tinued, but actually increased, vitality.40 
39. Atiyah attributes its failure to its inability to cope with externalities, with monopolies 
and other market failures, and with the problems of consumer ignorance. For a discussion of 
the failure of classical law, see pp. 681-715. For modern trends and doctrine, see pp. 716-79. 
40. Aliyah sees its influence in the proposed abolition of consideration and the elimination 
of Statute of Frauds requirements. Such movements, which look progressive, may stand re-
vealed, in the light and with the guidance of Aliyah's history and theory, as retrograde and 
even "perverse." 
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A fairly obvious reaction to this would be to ask what harm is 
being done by this disjunction, this discordance between theory and 
practice. The author himself suggests that the practical conse-
quences will be slight.41 But classical contract theory makes the 
common law's protection of reliance and benefit, and prevention of 
unconscionable overreaching, an uphill fight, with the cards stacked 
- in lawyer's language the burden of proof- against them. Of 
course, it is possible to shrug and say that if the common law has 
only to turn to tort when it is unable on classical contract theory to 
enforce a standard, well, we have seen that sort of thing before, in a 
process which seems as innocuous as it appears eternal. But the bur-
den is on the party whose claim is unsound under classical contract 
law, however deserving by all standards prevailing outside that law. 
And the danger always remains that lack of imagination and even of 
broadly based technical skill, in judges, will result in dismissal rather 
than in the devising of tort doctrine to cover the case. A court whose 
members well understand the pervasive ideology of the times may 
nevertheless, in the grip of this one idea, consider itself bound to 
dismiss the claim that is not the very model of the model classical 
model. 
Burdens of proof attach outside the courtroom as well as in, 
whether or not eo no mine, whether or not even recognized. Between 
those who espouse and those who oppose free-market principles,42 
the burden has, since the nineteenth-century, attached to the latter: 
However prevalent interference may be, however much rule rather 
than exception, however true it is that much of the interference is in 
fact greatly desired by those supposedly in principled opposition, it is 
always interference that must be justified (p. 386). It is one aim of 
Atiyah's book to demonstrate that such a distribution of burden is 
unwarranted. And one need not concur in every interpretive nuance 
to accept the major thesis: Freedom of contract as we know it arose 
in comprehensible, if overdone, response to conditions and needs of 
a particular time and situation; it is therefore inappropriate to clas-
sify either particular interferences, or philosophic commitment to 
governmental regulation and protection, as violative of eternal, im-
mutable, fundamental principle. In this I am in total agreement with 
41. The primary consequence will be to reduce to reliance loss in appropriate cases, and to 
nothing, perhaps, in cases where nothing but unacted-upon expectation is involved. 
42. According to the author: "at least in England there are, even now, few voices calling 
for a return to laissez-faire." P. 626. Some ofus can remember when England did not have a 
drug problem, or racial unrest. Just you wait, 'Enry 'lggins, just you wait! 
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Professor Atiyah, and I consider that he has done a major service in 
illuminating the history which illuminates that truth. 
This volume will superbly serve the reader for whom it is an in-
troduction to the subject; the specialist in the field will find in it an 
abundance of novel insight and provocative ideas. We have here a 
major scholarly contribution, and a splendid big book. 
